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BY JOHN LANDE & FORR
UNDER THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, lawyers
have a duty to screen potential Collaborative
Law (CL) cases for appropriateness and
obtain clients' informed consent to use CL.
The duty to screen cases is based on the "rea-
sonableness" requirement of Rule 1.2(c) and the requirement
to avoid conflicts of interest that might interfere with compe-
tent and diligent representation under Rule 1.7. Both rules
require lawyers to obtain clients' informed consent to partic-
ipate in a CL process. Although the Uniform Collaborative
Law Act is not an ethical rule, sections 14 and 15 create rel-
evant duties, including detailed provisions requiring lawyers
to make certain disclosures, provide prospective clients with
information needed to make an informed choice of dispute
resolution process, inquire about and discuss the appropri-
ateness of CL, and create a presumption against using CL
in cases involving a history of a coercive or violent rela-
tionship. (The Uniform Law Commission approved the
Uniform Collaborative Law Act at its July 2009 meet-
ing. In response to criticisms by some members of the
American Bar Association, the commission is consider-
ing some changes not relevant to this article. See
Uniform Law Commission, Uniform Collaborative Law Act,
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/CommitteeSearchResults.aspx?comrnittee=279.)
Collaborative law is an impressive dispute resolution process that offers sig-
nificant benefits for disputants in appropriate cases. In CL, lawyers and clients
sign a four-way "participation agreement" promising to use an interest-based
approach to negotiation and fully disclose all relevant information. A key ele-
ment of the participation agreement is the "disqualification agreement," which
provides that both parties' CL lawyers would be disqualified from representing
the clients if the case is litigated. The disqualification agreement is intended to
motivate parties and lawyers to negotiate constructively because termination of
a CL process would require both parties to hire new lawyers if they want legal
representation. Although a CL process can be
used in many types of cases, almost all cases to
date have been in family law matters.
It is especially important for lawyers to
screen cases and obtain informed consent to
use CL before their clients engage in the
process. By definition, parties in CL risk losing
the continued representation by their CL
lawyers and, under standard professional pro-
cedures, once parties have signed a participa-
tion agreement, they cannot mutually rescind
the disqualification agreement. Section 4(b)(2)
of the Uniform Collaborative Law Act would
laes say9 about codify that practice by prohibiting parties from
waiving the disqualification agreement. Since
A- nthe disqualification provision is irrevocable
and disqualification can have significant conse-
quences, the precautions of screening and
obtaining informed consent prior to represent-
EST S. MOSTEN ing parties in CL are quite appropriate.
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Limiting the scope of representation
Rule 1.2(c) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
states, "A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation
if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and
the client gives informed consent." When lawyers provide
CL representation, they limit the scope of their representa-
tion by excluding the possibility of representing CL clients
in litigation. ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 07-447 (2007)
confirms that CL is a "permissible limited scope representa-
tion under Model Rule 1.2, with the concomitant duties of
competence, diligence, and communication." To date, ten
state bar associations and the ABA have issued ethical opin-
ions about CL. Except for the Colorado opinion, all have
indicated that CL practice can comply with the applicable
ethical rules. The Colorado opinion states that CL is an
impermissible conflict of interest where lawyers enter con-
tractual agreements requiring them to withdraw if the CL
process is unsuccessful, though the process does not violate
Many practit ioners use CL
participation agreements to esta
contractua obligations to
"third persons," namely the otL
la e and party
the rules if the parties, but not the lawyers, execute the par-
ticipation agreement. Colorado Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm.,
Formal Op. 115 (2006). Of course, lawyers are governed
only by binding opinions in their jurisdictions. Ethics opin-
ions governing CL are posted on the website of the ABA
Section of Dispute Resolution's Collaborative Law
Committee, http://www.abanet.org/dch/committee.cfm?
com=DR035000.K W entucky Bar Association Ethics
Opinion E-425 (2005) states, "A
lawyer cannot advise a client to use
the collaborative process without
assessing whether it is truly in the
client's best interest." Pennsylvania
Informal Opinion 2004-24, 2004 WL 2758094 (2004),
states that CL lawyers "must consider each client's situation
(especially those who are victims of domestic violence)
when deciding whether a Rule 1.2(c) limitation on the
scope of representation is reasonable and whether [they]
can, indeed, provide competent representation to a client
under the limited scope of representation." New Jersey
Ethics Opinion 699, 14 N.J.L. 2474, 182 N.J.L.J. 1055,
2005 WL 3890576 (2005), provides some elaboration:
Whether the limitation that forbids a lawyer engaged
in collaborative practice from participation in adver-
sarial proceedings is "reasonable" within the meaning
of [Rule] 1.2(c) is a determination that must be made
in the first instance by the lawyer, exercising sound
professional judgment in assessing the needs of the
client. If, after the exercise of that judgment, the
lawyer believes that a client's interests are likely to be
well-served by participation in the collaborative law
process, then this limitation would be reasonable and
thus consistent with [Rule] 1.2(c)....
However, because of the particular potential for hardship
to both clients if the collaborative law process should fail and
an impasse result, we think it appropriate to give some more
specific guidance to the Bar as to when this limitation upon
representation is "reasonable" under the circumstances.
Thus, given the harsh outcome in the event of such failure,
we believe that such representation and putative withdrawal
is not "reasonable" if the lawyer, based on her knowledge and
experience and after being fully informed about the existing
relationship between the parties, believes that
there is a significant possibility that an impasse
will result or the collaborative process otherwiseblishwill fail.
Books written by CL experts identify factors
regarding appropriateness of CL including: (1)
her the motivation and suitability of the parties to
participate effectively in a collaborative process,
(2) the trustworthiness of the parties, (3)
whether a party is intimidated from participat-
ing effectively in the collaborative process, (4)
whether there has been a history of domestic violence
between the parties, (5) whether a party has a mental illness,
(6) whether a party is abusing alcohol or other drugs, (7)
whether the lawyers are suitable for handling the case col-
laboratively, (8) whether the parties would use professional
services in addition to collaborative legal services, (9) the
parties' ability to afford to retain new lawyers if the collabo-
rative process terminates without agreement, and (10) the
parties' views about the risks of disqualification of lawyers
and other professionals in the case. See John Lande and
Forrest S. Mosten, 'Collaborative Lawyers' Duties to Screen
the Appropriateness of Collaborative Law and Obtain
Clients' Informed Consent to Use Collaborative Law," 25
Ohio State Journal of Dispute Resolution 347 (2010). The
existence of any of these factors does not necessarily preclude
lawyers from undertaking a CL representation. Rather, these
factors should help guide lawyers in complying with their
ethical obligations.
If there is a significant risk that using CL in a case would
not realistically advance a client's (or prospective client's)
interests, the New Jersey opinion holds that undertaking a
CL representation would not be a reasonable limitation of
the scope of representation and would violate Rule 1.2. For
example, if a CL client is a victim of domestic violence, is
afraid that the other party is dishonest and would take
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advantage of the CL process, and/or cannot afford to hire
litigation counsel in the event of termination of a CL
process, it might be unreasonable for a lawyer to use CL.
Although Rule 1.2 requires clients to provide informed
consent to a limited-scope representation, such consent
would be insufficient to authorize the representation if it
would be found unreasonable under the circumstances. It
can be difficult to assess the reasonableness of using CL and
practitioners' honest professional judgments may differ
from later determinations by ethics committees or courts.
Practitioners should avoid undertaking CL cases when it
clearly would be unreasonable. On the other hand, ethics
committees and courts should not chill lawyers' reasonable
efforts to help clients when it appears that CL might be
appropriate considering the facts reasonably knowable at
the time.
The ethical rules suggest that CL lawyers should contin-
ue to assess the appropriateness of CL throughout a case. If
continued use of the process becomes unreasonable at any
time, CL lawyers may be required to reassess whether the
representation is permissible and, if they conclude that it is
no longer reasonable, terminate the representation.
Consider the following scenario: the parties have invest-
ed substantial time and money in a CL process, the
prospects for settlement are doubtful, and if the CL process
continues without reaching agreement, one or both parties
may be unable to afford litigation. In another situation, at
the outset of a CL case, the lawyers do not realize that a
party has a serious substance abuse problem but, during the
process, they discover the problem and the party refuses to
get treatment and act cooperatively. In these situations,
under Rule 1.2, lawyers would presumably be required to
reassess the case and terminate representation if continuing
would be unreasonable and/or harmful to clients.
Impermissible conflicts of interest
Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
requires CL lawyers to screen cases to avoid potential con-
flicts of interest and to obtain clients' informed consent
prior to initiating representation. Rule 1.7 provides, in part:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall
not represent a client if the representation involves
a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent
conflict of interest exists if:... (2) there is a signifi-
cant risk that the representation of one or more
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to.. .a third person....
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent
conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer
may represent a client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer
will be able to provide competent and diligent
representation to each affected client;
... ; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent,
confirmed in writing.
Comment 8 to Rule 1.7 states that "a conflict exists if
there is a significant risk that a lawyer's ability to consider,
recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for
the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's other
responsibilities or interests."
The ABA ethics opinion is consistent with this analysis,
stating that a "contractual obligation to withdraw creates on
the part of each lawyer a 'responsibility to a third party'
within the meaning of Rule 1.7(a)(2)" and concluding that
"[fr]esponsibilities to third parties constitute conflicts with
one's own client only if there is a significant risk that those
responsibilities will materially limit the lawyer's representa-
tion of the client."
Ithough the contractual structure of
CL processes varies, many practition-
ers use CL participation agreements to
establish contractual obligations to
"third persons," namely the other
lawyer and party. Standard 7.1 .A(1) of
the International Academy of Collaborative Professionals's
(IACP) Ethical Standards for Collaborative Practitioners
states that CL lawyers may not "knowingly withhold or mis-
represent information material to the Collaborative
process." Virtually all CL participation agreements include
similar provisions. The IACP standards do not define "mate-
rial information," but many participation agreements
require disclosure of much more information than would
legally be discoverable. For example, the model participation
agreement in Pauline Tesler's book, Collaborative Law:
Achieving Effective Resolution in Divorce Without Litigation
(ABA Family Law Section, 2d ed. 2008), includes a provi-
sion committing lawyers and parties to "honesty and the full
disclosure of all relevant information." Tesler argues that a
CL process must be "transparent," which includes "honesty
and candor about what one is doing and why one is doing
it" and "candor about goals, priorities, and reasoning." Thus,
CL requires parties to disclose what Professor Carrie
Menkel-Meadow calls "settlement facts" which:
[M]ay not be legally relevant but which either go to
the underlying needs, interests, and objectives of the
parties-why they want what they want in a dis-
pute-or such sensitive information as financial infor-
mation, insurance coverage, trade secrets, future busi-
ness plans that may affect the possible range of settle-
ments or solutions but which would not necessarily be
discoverable in litigation. Settlement facts are to be
distinguished from "legal facts" (those which would be
either discoverable or admissible in litigation).
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, "Ethics in Alternative Dispute
Resolution: New Issues, No Answers From The Adversary
Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities," 38 S. Texas Law
Review 407 (1997).
FALL 2010 33
A second obligation of lawyers under many CL partici-
pation agreements is to correct mistakes made by the other
lawyer or party. For example, a party to a participation
agreement (which sometimes include lawyers) may be
required to inform the other side of any suspected numeri-
cal miscalculations or typographical errors, inaccurate fac-
tual assumptions, or reliance by that counsel on legal
authorities that have been overruled or superseded.
Third, by definition, lawyers are obliged to withdraw
from a CL case if any party, including the opposing party,
terminates the case. Thus, CL lawyers undertake obliga-
tions to third persons, and rule 1.7 requires lawyers to con-
sider whether they can provide competent and diligent rep-
resentation to their clients in a CL case.J  some situations, CL lawyers would have an
impermissible conflict of interest because they
would not be able to provide competent and dili-
gent representation. The appropriateness factors
listed in the preceding section would be relevant
to this analysis. For example, if a lawyer repre-
sents a victim of domestic violence who seeks a divorce
from her abuser, who has been proved to be untrustworthy
and would likely seek to take advantage of a CL process,
rule 1.7 would presumably prohibit the lawyer from repre-
senting the client in a CL process. In that situation, the vic-
tim's lawyer would be caught in a conflict between protect-
ing the client, who may be harmed by participating in CL,
and complying with obligations under the CL participation
agreement. For some vulnerable clients, merely participat-
A party to a participation
agreement (which sometimes
include lawyers) may be require
to inform the other side of an)
suspected numerical miscalculati
ing in a process with an intimidating opponent may seri-
ously undermine their ability to assert their interests.
Abusers can send subtle signals to victims, which everyone
else may miss, threatening the victims if he or she does not
accede to the abuser's demands. In such situations, lawyers
might have difficulty in diligently representing their clients'
interests in negotiating an agreement with an unscrupulous
adversary. Although it is possible that such lawyers could
avoid an impermissible conflict of interest, it is a significant
risk that lawyers should consider seriously.
Rule 1.7 requires a lawyer to obtain a client's informed
consent before representing the client in a conflict-of-inter-
est situation, though the client's consent is not sufficient to
authorize the representation if the lawyer cannot provide
competent and diligent representation. If the concerns
described above are reasonably addressed, however, CL
lawyers can provide competent and diligent representation
that fully meets ethical standards.
Obtaining informed consent
Rule 1.0(e) defines informed consent as "the agreement by a
person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has
communicated adequate information and explanation about
the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to
the proposed course of conduct." Comment 6 to rule 1.0
states:
The communication necessary to obtain such consent
will vary according to the Rule involved and the cir-
cumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed
consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the client or other person possesses infor-
mation reasonably adequate to make an informed
decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication
that includes a disclosure of the facts and circum-
stances giving rise to the situation, any explanation
reasonably necessary to inform the client or other per-
son of the material advantages and disadvantages of
the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of
the client's or other person's options and alterna-
tives.... In determining whether the information and
explanation provided are reasonably adequate, rele-
vant factors include whether the client or other per-
son is experienced in legal matters generally and in
making decisions of the type involved, and whether
the client or other person is independently rep-
resented by other counsel in giving the consent.
The ethics opinions set high standards for
informed consent in a CL process. For example,
id the Kentucky opinion states, "[B]ecause the rela-
tionship between the [CL] lawyer and the client is
different from what would normally be expected,
Dns the lawyer has a heightened obligation to commu-
nicate with the client regarding the representation
and the special implications of collaborative law
process...." This opinion states that CL lawyers must advise
clients about a list of potential risks.
The client must consent to the limited representation,
which means he or she must be advised of the limit-
ed nature of the relationship and the implications of
the arrangement. For example, obtaining new counsel
will entail additional time and cost; the client may
feel pressured to settle in order to avoid having to
obtain new counsel; and the failure to reach a settle-
ment, necessitating new counsel, is not within the
exclusive control of the client-the opponent can
effectively disqualify both counsel. The client may be
willing to assume these and other risks of the collab-
orative process but, as previously discussed, the lawyer
must communicate sufficient information so that the
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client has an adequate basis upon which to base such
a decision.
The New Jersey opinion also notes significant risks in
CL, indicates that CL lawyers have a heightened duty of dis-
closure, and warns CL lawyers that they must provide clients
with a reasonable analysis of the clients' interests regarding
possible use of CL, even if this conflicts with the lawyers'
interests in getting CL cases:
[I]t is easy to imagine situations in which a lawyer
who practices collaborative law would be naturally
inclined to describe [the] risks and benefits to the
client in a way that promotes the creation of the rela-
tionship, even if the client's interests might be better
served by a more traditional form of legal representa-
tion....We are not prepared to conclude categorically
The Kentucky opinion indicates tl
mere sing of a CL partic patio
agreement is insuffc ient to constit
informed consent
at this juncture that lawyers who engage in collabora-
tive law would be unable to deal with those conflicts
honorably, or could not give the client the informa-
tion necessary to decide whether to consent to the
limitation. But informed consent regarding the limit-
ed scope of representation that applies in the collabo-
rative law process is especially demanded, and the
lawyer's requirement of disclosure of the potential
risks and consequences of failure is concomitantly
heightened, because of the consequences of a failed
process to the client, or, alternatively, the possibility
that the parties could become "captives" to a process
that does not suit their needs.
The Kentucky opinion indicates that mere signing of a
CL participation agreement is insufficient to constitute
informed consent and that CL lawyers should discuss the
process with clients and provide an opportunity for ques-
tions.
Although the collaborative law agreement may touch
on these matters [such as advantages and risks of dif-
ferent processes], it is unlikely that, standing alone, it
is sufficient to meet the requirements of the rules
relating to consultation and informed decision mak-
ing. The agreement may serve as a starting point, but
it should be amplified by a fuller explanation and an
opportunity for the client to ask questions and discuss
the matter. Those conversations must be tailored to
the specific needs of the client and the circumstances
of the particular representation. The Committee rec-
ommends that before having the client sign the col-
laborative agreement, the lawyer confirm in writing
the lawyer's explanation of the collaborative process
and the client's consent to its use.
Thus the ethical opinions make clear that lawyers must
engage in a thorough discussion with clients to comply with
the obligation of obtaining informed consent.
Conclusion
Lawyers offering CL representation must comply with all
ethical rules for lawyers generally. Under the rules govern-
ing a limited scope of representation and conflicts of inter-
est, before undertaking a CL representation, lawyers must
determine if the process is appropriate for a prospective
client and obtain informed consent. Although the consent
is normally in writing, lawyers do not comply with their
duties if they obtain clients' signatures without a
careful discussion of the benefits and risks of CL
and other dispute resolution options. By providing
appropriate information before parties decide
ute whether to use CL, lawyers can have greater confi-
dence that parties will have realistic expectations,
participate in the process more constructively, and
be less likely to terminate a CL case.
Although preventing all problems is impossible,
compliance with these duties seems likely to prevent some,
but certainly not all, complaints about CL (or any form of
practice), as well as maximize competent client care.
Clearly, complying with these ethical duties advances the
interests of clients and lawyers. Not only are clients better
protected, but also such compliance increases confidence in
and use of CL, which is growing in consumer demand and
acceptance by lawyers and judges. FA
John Lande is the Isidor Loeb Professor and
Director of the LLM Program in Dispute
Resolution at the University of Missouri School
of Law. He is an award-winning writer who
has written extensively about cooperative and
collaborative processes. He may be reached at
http://www.law.missouri.edu/lande/.
Forrest S. Mosten is a Certified Family
Law Specialist in Los Angeles. He handles com-
plex estates and high-conflict divorce matters
and specializes in negotiating and drafting
premarital and postmarital agreements. He
serves as Adjunct Professor at UCLA School of
Law, is the author of Collaborative Divorce
Handbook (2009), and is the editor of Family Court Review's
special issue on collaborative law to be published in April 2011.
He may be reached at www.mostenmediation.com. This article is
adapted from John Lande and Forrest S. Mosten, "Collaborative
Lawyers' Duties to Screen the Appropriateness of Collaborative
Law and Obtain Clients' informed Consent to Use Collaborative
Law," 25 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 347 (2010).
I A LL 21 1P 35
